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“BOILERPLATE”: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
Omri Ben-Shahar*
 
 
 
Abstract
 
 
This short essay introduces the themes that are developed in twelve 
articles that were delivered recently in a symposium on “Boilerplate: 
Foundations of Market Contracts” at the University of Michigan 
Law School. The proceeding of the symposium will be published in 
Volume 104 of the Michigan Law Review. 
________________________________________________________ 
*  Professor of Law and Economics, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 
(omri@umich.edu). 
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It is tempting to open this symposium with yet another “boilerplate” salute to 
the challenge that standard form contracts pose for contract law doctrine. You 
may have seen plenty such tributes to this fundamental problem. If I were to 
offer my own variation on this familiar introduction, I would have perhaps tried 
to come up with an original spin, to induce you to read forward another 
paragraph or two. I would probably have talked about a major divide within 
contract law, between the “law of negotiations” and “product regulation.” The 
former is the body of doctrines that determine the legal consequences of 
bargaining behavior; the later is the assortment of substantive limitations on 
terms of bargains, some general to all contracts, other industry- or area-specific. 
I would then have argued that the study of standard form belongs to the latter, 
not the former, and that this distinction can help overcome many difficulties in 
contract law doctrine. 
 
Such would surely be an appropriate overture for a conference on boilerplate. 
Boilerplate, recall, are the building blocks of standard form, non-negotiated, 
contracts. The enforceability of boilerplate is very much the legal locus where 
the philosophical debate over the regulation of markets hits the road. Boilerplate 
employment arbitration terms, for example, are the core of one of the most 
intriguing and fundamental debates in current contract law, over the scope of the 
unconscionability doctrine.1
 
And yet, with “boilerplate” being the theme of this conference, there is a 
looming paradoxical feature with such an introduction: it would be, in and of 
itself, a boilerplate introduction! It would satisfy all the attributes that 
introductions-to-symposia are known to have. It would begin with a general 
reminder of the importance (and timeliness!) of the topic. It would demonstrate 
that the “stakes” are more than just conceptual-scholarly clarity, but rather that 
the business world anxiously awaits the academia’s “last word” on the topic—
here, the academic gospel concerning the efficacy of market contracts. The 
standard introduction would then maintain that the issues are not yet resolved, 
cite leading scholars who have acknowledged how difficult the issues are, and 
posit that this lack of resolution is manifested in inadequate development of the 
doctrine. And finally, this hypothetical introduction would lay out a set of 
questions that ought to be addressed, and the various ways in which the 
contributions to the symposium advance the answers to these questions.  
 
________________________________________________________ 
1 Compare the California Supreme Court’s holding in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare 
Services, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 785 (2000) with the Seventh Circuit view in Oblix v. 
Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488 (7th Cir., 2004). 
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You likely have read, by now, many such introductions to symposia, and can 
recognize their boilerplate structure, their adherence to the how-to-write-an-
introduction protocol. But if this hypothetical introduction—the one I eventually 
decided not to write—is indeed standard and predictable, it doesn’t only 
introduce the topic of “boilerplate;” it is also embodies that very phenomenon. 
Thus, ironically, it must satisfy many of the characteristics of boilerplate that 
the articles in this symposium will describe. Writing an introduction about 
boilerplate, it turns out, is also producing a boilerplate!  
 
Perhaps the most obvious analogy between boilerplate contract and boilerplate 
introductions is the following. Like boilerplate contracts, boilerplate 
introductions-to-symposia are not read by anybody. (Why, then, are they 
written, you may naïvely wonder. I’ll say something about this below.) The 
“unreadness” property is of course a troubling phenomenon, both for contracts 
and for symposia-introductions. Luckily, some of the contributions to this 
symposium address this unreadness feature of boilerplate. Robert Hillman, for 
example, investigates whether internet disclosure mechanisms can help 
consumer know what’s in the contract, or would they merely backfire against 
the interest of consumers;2 Michelle Boardman suggests that in some industries 
the unreadness (and unreadability) of boilerplate is a perfectly reasonable—in 
fact, desirable—feature of a system in which contract terms are written not to 
expropriate value, but to stabilize meanings.3
 
Here is a second analogy between boilerplate terms and symposia introductions: 
they appear “objective,” but they are often one-sided. You can probably recall 
some introductions you read to past symposia (despite their unreadness…), in 
which the introducer puts on a mask of neutrality, acknowledged all the relevant 
and conflicting perspectives, provided broad-as-possible context and normative 
appeal, and yet planted in all of that objectivity his or her own controversial 
agenda, building upon a set of selective assumptions and skewed observations. I 
am sure I can recall some such introductions, and I’m pretty sure I even wrote 
one.4 Similar to introductions, this buried one-sidedness is also a very familiar 
feature of boilerplate contracts. Disguised by “legalese,” they are often 
unbalanced, favoring their drafter. But while the one-sidedness of consumer 
contracts is hardly a discovery, several contributions to the symposium offer a 
new understanding of this phenomenon. Lucian Bebchuk and Richard Posner in 
________________________________________________________ 
2 Robert Hillman, On-Line Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms 
Backfire? 
3  Michelle Boardman, Contra Proferentem—the Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate. 
4 Omri Ben-Shahar, Forward – Freedom From Contract, in Symposium on Freedom from Contract, 2004 
Wisc. L. Rev. 261. 
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one paper,5 and Jason Johnston in another paper,6 argue that self-serving 
boilerplate terms may not be as bad as they seem. They argue that one-sided 
terms are a general feature of contracts written by firms who care about their 
reputations and who do not intend to strictly enforce such terms. These two 
papers argue that firms write one-sided terms in order to have the option to 
enforce them selectively, to fend-off consumer opportunism, but otherwise let 
their honest clients off. Johnston nicely calls it “tailored forgiveness”; 
Bebchuk/Posner attribute this feature to the observability but non-verifiability of 
opportunism—that is, to the difficulty of proving it in court. Both these papers 
portray a reality in which one-sidedness poses less of a concern than previously 
recognized. In contrast, Ronald Mann examines one-sided boilerplate in credit 
card contracts and concludes that they continue to burden debtors.7 He suggests 
that contract law doctrine may be inadequate in dealing with this problem, and 
explores the case for prohibitions against some such terms, or even a regulatory 
promulgation of more balanced mandatory clauses. 
 
There is another, more subtle feature of introductions-to-symposia, which they 
again share with boilerplate terms. In a typical introduction, the collection of 
papers in the symposium being introduced is not a result of a tournament or 
competition between able scholars. The list is solicited, tailored, and the writer 
of the introduction is usually the person who put together this list, shaped it to 
correspond with what he or she perceives to be the ideal agenda. In the same 
way that the introduction describes a substance that is not negotiated but rather 
unilaterally tailored, the boilerplate contract stipulates a substance of a 
transaction that is not negotiated or bilaterally dickered, but rather dictated, 
unilaterally drafted. Of course, this raises difficult questions about the 
relationship between boilerplate and the power to dictate. Douglas Baird 
demonstrates in this conference some of the fallacies that have become all-too-
common in addressing this relationship.8 He argues that the evils of 
concentrated economic power have nothing to do boilerplate. Revisiting some 
of the classic cases from the folklore of contract law, he shows that it is not the 
fine print that makes some clauses troublesome. But in a rich and original paper, 
David Gilo and Ariel Porat show a variety of previously unrecognized ways in 
which boilerplate terms do operate in an anti-competitive fashion, such as to 
price discriminate, facilitate collusion among sellers, and deter entry by new 
________________________________________________________ 
5 Lucian Bebchuk and Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets. 
6 Jason S. Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of Standard Form Contracts and the 
Negotiation of Business Relationships 
7 Ronald Mann, “Contracting” for Credit 
8 Douglas Baird, The Boilerplate Paradox 
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sellers.9 The unilateral drafting of boilerplate is also studied by Ben-Shahar and 
White in a merchant-to-merchant context. They study the contract between 
automotive companies and their suppliers, one of the most important (in terms 
of economic stakes) form contracts ever drafted.10 They uncover several ways 
in which the drafters of these contracts prevent negotiations and tailoring from 
ever occurring, to bolster their economic rents.  
 
If there is a significant boilerplate element to the craft of writing an 
introduction—if introductions are indeed standard and predictable—it begs the 
question: why bother writing them? Similarly, if a form contract is boilerplate, 
to be used and replicated by many similarly situated parties, why would any 
single individual have the incentive to draft it? A boilerplate contract is a public 
good—an “item” that is copied freely by others—and we should therefore 
expect a problem of underproduction. This question is studied directly by Kevin 
Davis, who identifies the production paradox and looks at the role of nonprofit 
organizations in generating boilerplate contracts.11 It is also studied by Stephen 
Choi and Mitu Gulati, who look at the incentives of boilerplate drafters, and 
define their crucial role in giving interpretive meaning to boilerplate.12 Choi and 
Gulati’s study is even more ambitious: it suggests that a better way to 
understand the emergence of boilerplate—and to interpret it when ambiguous—
is to perceive of it as statute and apply statutory interpretation techniques to 
dispute resolutions. 
 
I have noticed another thing about published symposia: readers rarely sit down 
to read an entire symposium, from the introduction to the last article. Rather, 
most readers may bump into one or a small subset of individual symposium 
papers that are of particular interest to them. This suggests that, other than for 
the participants in the conference, there is really no audience for introductions. 
Summarizing to the hypothetical symposium reader what the articles of the 
symposium are about is a service that future readers don’t really need, and of 
which very few would make use. In other words, symposia introductions are a 
wasteful—inefficient?—scholarly effort. This conclusion is every bit as 
unorthodox as the idea that boilerplate contracts may also be inefficient. And 
yet the claim that boilerplate could be inefficient is a more difficult proposition 
to defend. There is a long tradition in law and economics arguing for the 
efficiency of standard form contracts. Several of the contributions in this 
________________________________________________________ 
9  David Gilo and Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate in Standard Form Contracts 
10 Omri Ben-Shahar and James J. White, Boilerplate and Economics Power in Auto Manufacturing 
Contracts 
11  Kevin Davis, The Role of Non-Profits in the Production of Boilerplate 
12 Stephen Choi and Mitu G. Gulati, Contract as Statute 
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symposium, however, suggest otherwise, and provide either evidence or new 
theoretical underpinnings for the inefficiency conjecture.13 Stephen Choi and 
Mitu Gulati, studying the evolution of boilerplate in sophisticated transactions, 
show why it is often unlikely that boilerplate converge to the most efficient 
terms.14  
 
If I somehow got you to read thus far, you may recognize that this introduction 
includes two types of “information.” The first type is specific to the forthcoming 
symposium and conveys its particular context (e.g., my references to the 
specific papers and to the prior standard form contracts literature). The second 
type of stuff you read is more general and can be used, with almost no changes, 
to introduce other symposia, on a variety of topics. This distinction roughly 
corresponds to what Henry Smith, in his important contribution to this 
conference, calls intensive and extensive communications.15 Contracts, when 
drafted ad-hoc, are highly intensive information-rich rights. Property, in 
contrast, is less context-dependent, less information-specific, and therefore more 
extensive. Smith suggests that boilerplate represents a shift of contractual rights 
towards the status of property. He argues that the modularity feature of 
boilerplate is what allows it to have its extensive appeal. 
 
Finally, in many contracts that are otherwise skewed in favor of their drafter, we 
nevertheless find boilerplate terms that appear to accord some balance. For 
example, one of the “hidden roles” of boilerplate that Gilo and Porat discover in 
their paper is the provision of true and accessible benefits—but only to those 
who labor to read the unreadable contract.16 Likewise, two contributions to this 
conference are aimed at providing more balance—and more fairness?—to the 
otherwise dominant law-and-economics presence, but, like boilerplate, can be 
accessible mainly to readers who will labor to read through most of the other 
articles. I have asked two of the more influential scholars that have studied 
standard form contracts using other approaches to comment on the ideas that are 
advanced in the symposium. Accordingly, Margaret Jane Radin, whose recent 
work identifies new challenges posed by standardization of contract in the 
digital age,17 and Todd Rakoff, whose seminal work on contracts of adhesion 
________________________________________________________ 
13 Gilo and Porat, supra note 9, show various ways in which boilerplate reduce competition and thus 
reduce total welfare; Ben-Shahar and White, supra note 10, suggest that standard form purchase orders 
in the automotive business exhibit various inefficient terms.  
14  Choi & Gulati, supra note 12. 
15 Henry Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow. 
16 Gilo and Porat, supra note 9,  p. 19. 
17 Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1125 (2002); Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L. J. 1125 (2000); 
Regime Change in Intellectual Property Law: Superseding the Law of the State with the “Law” of the 
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continues to provide a baseline for the study of form contracts,18 responded to 
this challenge.19 Note that these “comments” are anything but the boilerplate 
comments that sometimes are affixed to symposium articles. Rather, this 
symposium provides a platform for Radin and for Rakoff to examine the 
emerging inventory of new ideas about boilerplate—an inventory that is 
hopefully richer after this symposium—and to reevaluate their own thinking on 
the topic. 
 
* * * * * 
 
As occasional market transactors, you surely know that many important details 
of transactions you are about to enter are buried in boilerplate, but you often 
prefer to read sellers’ pamphlets to figure out the “big picture,” what the bargain 
is about. What, then, is the big picture coming out of this symposium? What can 
we write on our pamphlet? I think we can safely say this symposium is breaking 
new ground in the study of boilerplate and standard forms, beyond the general 
claims about market power and network externalities. On a theoretical level, 
boilerplate is shown to be a legal phenomenon different than contract. Is it a 
statute? Is it property? Is it a product? On an empirical level, boilerplate is 
studied in specific contexts, including insurance, credit cards, auto 
manufacturing, debt financing, and electronic commerce. The contributions to 
the symposium reveal subtle and previously unrecognized ways in which 
boilerplate clauses encourage information flow—but also dampen it; increase 
competition—but also reduce it; how new boilerplate terms are produced—and 
how innovation in boilerplate is stifled; how negotiation happens in the shadow 
of boilerplate—and how it is subdued; and offer new explanations as to why 
boilerplate is so often one-sided. With emphasis on empiricism and economic 
thinking, this symposium provides a more nuanced understanding of the “DNA” 
of market contracts—the boilerplate terms.  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
Firm, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 173 (2003-2004). 
18 Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction , 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983) 
19 [Cite Radin’s and Rakoff’s comments here]. 
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